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Using Cyber-Insurance as a Risk Management
Strategy: Knowledge Gaps and
Recommendations for Further Research
Inger Anne Tndel, Per Hakon Meland, Aida Omerovic,
Erlend Andreas Gjre, and Bjrnar Solhaug
SINTEF ICT, Norway
Abstract. Risk transfer can be an economically favorable way of han-
dling security and privacy issues, but choosing this option indiscrim-
inately and without proper knowledge is a risk in itself. This report
provides an overview of knowledge gaps related to cyber-insurance as a
risk management strategy. These are grouped into three high-level topics;
cyber-insurance products, understanding and measuring risk and estima-
tion of consequences. The topics are further divided into 11 knowledge
areas with recommendations for further research. The work is based on
a study of academic literature and other written materials, such as var-
ious reports and newspaper articles. There is a clear lack of empirical
data on cyber-insurance, and in particular qualitative studies aiming
to understand and describe needs, obstacles and processes relevant for
cyber-insurance. We recommend a stronger emphasis on research related
to topics that are specic to cyber-insurance, covering decision mod-
els for buyers of insurance, barriers for information sharing, impact of
cyber-insurance on security, and business models for insurers.
Keywords: cyber-insurance; risk management; cyber-incident impact
1 Introduction
Nearly all organizations are highly dependent on Information and Communica-
tion Technology (ICT) in their daily business. As a consequence, ICT incidents
can aect organizations' ability to meet business goals. Security conscious orga-
nizations are aware of cyber-risks and take measures to reduce this risk. However,
it is not possible nor economically feasible to protect against all eventualities.
Thus, businesses can benet from a mixed approach to cyber-risk management
[50], taking into account a wide variety of risk reducing measures, including risk
transfer in the form of cyber-insurance.
Cyber-insurance has been dened in literature as \the transfer of nancial
risk associated with network and computer incidents to a third party" [12]. A
cyber-insurance policy can, for instance, cover liability issues, (digital) property
loss and theft, data damage, loss of income from network outage and computer
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failures or web-site defacement [7], and is more specialized than traditional busi-
ness interruption and crime insurances. Though cyber-insurance has been men-
tioned as a topic in the academic literature for more than two decades (see
Bohme and Schwartz [12] for an overview of early works on cyber-insurance),
the cyber-insurance products are still relatively immature. This is underlined by
statements such as \cyber policies are still the Wild West of insurance policies"
[16] and \products are untested, pricing appears arbitrary and experimentation
in contract writing is commonplace" [6]. The research on cyber-insurance is still
in its early stages, and more knowledge is needed in various areas to support the
development of improved cyber-insurance products, as well as to understand the
impact cyber-insurance has on the security of organizations and society. Such
research will moreover make a contribution to the more general eld of the eco-
nomics of information security [2] that started o at the turn of the century. The
research eld was triggered by the observation that misaligned incentives are as
important as technical factors for explaining security failures [36].
This report provides an overview of knowledge gaps for cyber-insurance from
the viewpoint of dierent actors, and describes the current level of knowledge
in these areas. The motivation for providing such an overview is to support
and guide future research in this eld, and thus the report provides recommen-
dations for research based on the identication of these knowledge gaps. The
report is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the research method. Section
3 introduces the knowledge areas identied, while Sections 4 to 6 provide a more
detailed explanation of the knowledge needs and the knowledge gaps. Section 7
provides recommendations for future research and discusses the validity of the
work, while Section 8 concludes the report.
2 Research Method
In order to establish a baseline of the current state of cyber-insurance, we con-
ducted an initial survey on the topic. We quickly discovered that the academic
literature on cyber-insurance was not vast. To illustrate, a Scopus search in
April 2015 using the search phrase (cyberinsurance OR \cyber insurance" OR
\cyber risk insurance") resulted in only 40 hits (36 papers). Note that this search
also covers the string \cyber-insurance" as it yields the same result as a search
on \cyber insurance". In our work on identifying literature, we have thus also
looked outside the academic literature and into news articles, technical reports
and white papers. For the news articles we have prioritized recent publications
in the period from October 2013 to April 2015. We also had to take into ac-
count that news articles tend to replicate each other or share the same source,
so a large number of articles does not necessarily mean much novelty. This also
meant that we could aord to miss several articles, so we do not claim to have full
coverage of all news items published during our investigation period. Given the
backgrounds and location of the authors, we were moreover limited to articles
written in English or Norwegian.
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Our survey work helped us identify key knowledge areas for cyber-insurance.
This resulted in a list of 52 potential questions that we and the literature typi-
cally sought answers to. This list was then grouped (inductive, ground-up) into
14 themes. These themes were then considered together with research recom-
mendations and cyber-insurance market barriers identied in two key reports
[19, 56], and grouped into three main areas, with a total of 11 sub-areas.
In our work, we have primarily considered the risk-management aspects of
organizations and their knowledge needs when considering cyber-security as one
among several risk treatment strategies, as well as the needs of the insurance
companies in evaluating the risk-level of potential clients.
3 Key knowledge areas when Considering
Cyber-Insurance as a Risk Management Strategy
According to the widely established standard ISO/IEC 27005:2011 Informa-
tion security risk management [30], there are four main strategies available for
risk treatment: risk reduction, risk retention, risk avoidance and risk transfer.
The four risk treatment strategies are not mutually exclusive, and organizations
would usually benet from using a mixed approach to risk management. Select-
ing an economically optimal mix of risk treatment strategies, however, is not
trivial.
Businesses that want to utilize cyber-insurance as a risk management strat-
egy need to understand the risk they are facing, and how cyber-insurance can
reduce this risk. This implies a need to understand and evaluate cyber-insurance
policies. Insurance companies, on the other hand, need to be able to dierenti-
ate between potential clients based on the risk they are facing, so as to reduce
the risk of adverse selection [45]. They also need to understand the needs of
the various market segments, in order to oer cyber-insurance products that
are relevant. For both the supply and the demand side it is important to un-
derstand and document costs related to cyber-incidents, in order to agree on a
compensation in case there is an incident.
In this report, the description of the knowledge areas for cyber-insurance has
been divided into three high-level topics: cyber-insurance products (Section 4),
understanding and measuring risk (Section 5) and estimate consequences (Sec-
tion 6). An overview of the identied knowledge gaps is given in Table 1.
4 Cyber-Insurance Products (P)
Cyber-insurance can be oered according to various terms and be bundled in
dierent ways. For the success of cyber-insurance, it is important that the prod-
ucts meet customer needs, and that there are adequate business models available
for actors that have a role in oering insurance.
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4.1 Take-up of cyber-insurance (P1)
Information about cyber-insurance uptake in dierent regions can contribute to
understanding what makes cyber-insurance benecial to stakeholders [19, 56].
Cyber-insurance is a relatively new product, even though there have been in-
surances covering computer crime since the 1980s [52]. Such predecessors of
cyber-insurance were oered long before the existence of the Internet, covering,
for example, losses due to fraudulent modication or destruction of electronic
data. Given the criticality of ICT systems and the Internet of today, as well
as the cyber-security issues they represent, the demand for cyber-insurance has
increased, making the products more mainstream. According to Ernst & Young,
nearly 60 insurers write some form of cyber-insurance coverage in addition to
errors and omissions insurance [20]. However, it seems like there are great vari-
ations between the U.S. and Europe. Cyber-insurance is actually the fastest
growing niche insurance product in the U.S. [46]. A study found that 31 % of
businesses already have cyber-insurance policies, while another 39 % were plan-
ning to buy such policies in the near future [47].
As pointed out by Betterley [11], there were in Europe in 2012 only nine in-
surers with specialized cyber-insurance, compared to 30-40 in the US. According
to ENISA [19] there is limited data on the size of the cyber-insurance market in
Europe. A report from NSS Labs [13] states: Interestingly, the market for cyber
security insurance in the European Union is only a fraction of the current market
in the United States. (The gross domestic product [GDP] of the EU is larger than
that of the United States). In Norway, the rst pure cyber-insurance product was
launched in 2015 [4], but there have been other products, such as generic crime
insurances, that would cover some incidents related to cyber-crime. It is worth
noting that a survey in the UK showed that less than 10 % of UK companies
have cyber-insurance protection even though 52 % of CEOs believe that their
companies have some form of coverage in place [35].
Looking at the market segments, the sectors typically buying cyber-insurance
include retailers, health care providers, hotels and nancial services [19] . These
typically buy data breach insurances.
4.2 Government inuence (P2)
Governments can, for example through regulations, inuence the cyber-insurance
market. This role should be well understood, both to avoid undesirable eects
and to support initiatives that will improve overall cyber-security.
On February 12, 2013, the US President issued an executive order stating that
the cyber threat to critical infrastructure continues to grow and represents one of
the most serious national security challenges we must confront [41]. In order to
address this problem, one of the dened steps was to establish a Cyber Security
Framework. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) was
to engage cyber-security stakeholders, such as the insurance industry, in the
creation of this framework. One of the expected outcomes here was a more
competitive cyber-insurance market, and this can be seen as an example of how
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governments inuence the market through direct order. In Europe, the proposed
reform of data protection laws is expected to accelerate cyber-security insurance
adoption in Europe. A similar thing happened in the US as a result of the state
security breach notication laws [13].
In 2002, the US government passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA),
where the state acts as a re-insurance facility in case of a terrorist event that a
normal insurance company would not be able to cover. This same model could
be used for cyber-crime incidents with vast or catastrophic consequences to com-
plete sectors or society, and across countries [19].
4.3 Evaluate cyber-insurance products (P3)
There is little information available on what factors are most important when
deciding on whether or not to buy cyber-insurance. The Ponemon study [47]
however provides some insight:
{ 70 % of respondents reported that their company became more interested in
cyber-insurance policies after experiencing an incident.
{ Most companies believe that the cyber-security risk will either stay the same
or increase, something that increases desire to purchase insurance.
{ Those that do not plan to buy insurance provide the following main reasons
for this: \Premiums are too expensive" (52 %) and \Too many exclusions,
restrictions and uninsurable risks" (44 %).
{ Those with a cyber-insurance policy, however, believe premiums are fair (62
%).
Another possible reason for deciding not to buy cyber-insurance is a perception
that existing insurance, e.g., general business interruption policies, already cover
cyber-risk [19]. In the Ponemon study [47] 38 % of those that did not plan
to buy insurance provided the reason that \Property and casualty policies are
sucient".
SMEs are considered an important customer group for cyber-insurance, as
SMEs in general have limited information security resources in-house [8]. Some
insurance companies oer emergency response capacities to help deal with in-
cidents, and for SMEs this may be more important than claims payout [8, 16].
However, the policies also dier in respect to what incidents are covered, the
majority including incidents caused by human error or criminal attacks, but
with less coverage for system failures or insiders and very limited coverage for
attacks against business partners [47]. Policies may additionally exclude state
sponsored cyber-attacks [19]. For organizations that have limited information
security competence it may be dicult to understand the implications of such
exclusions.
We are not aware of any empirical studies of the organizational processes that
guide decisions on whether or not to buy cyber-insurance. Bandyopadhyay and
Shidore [6] have proposed a decision model for cyber-insurance based on existing
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theoretical models of organizational decision making. In addition, Bandyopad-
hyay [5] has developed nine hypotheses on adoption of cyber-insurance by organi-
zations. This is a good basis for performing empirical studies on cyber-insurance
adoption.
4.4 Customer interaction (P4)
An essential question for prospective customers is of course how much they are
willing to invest, both in the insurance, but also in the process of obtaining
coverage. In order to set a premium, the customer needs to share a potentially
large amount of information with the insurance company. According to Baer
& Parkinson [3], an insurance underwriter may rst ask prospective clients to
complete an \Information Security Self Assessment", which could include in-
formation on a wide range of security controls such as congurations and se-
curity documentation for network infrastructure, information security policies,
vulnerability monitoring, physical security and access controls, business conti-
nuity planning, periodic testing, etc. Depending on the extent of the insurance
coverage and policy limits sought, further assessments may need to be performed
by the insurer, including personal and physical inspections on the clients site.
An independent third party which is specialized in information security could
also be used to assess the customer. Since all such assessments are performed on
a case-by-case basis [40], potentially comparable to a certication process along
with the expertise needed to do them, the process comes with a potentially high
cost [42]. Actual certicates, for example for ISO/IEC 2700x standards compli-
ance, could in this respect provide companies a second-order advantage of being
certied, both through cheaper insurance and as a low-eort way for insurers
to be assured of a particular minimum level of security on the customer side.
While there might be several relevant certications that could be considered,
and large enterprises are well familiar with certication and audit processes, any
certication may be a barrier to undertake for smaller companies that also could
constitute a signicant market segment.
Interaction between insurer and the insured is needed also during the lifespan
of the insurance. The customer could at any time take actions, not necessarily
visible to the insurer, which have a positive or negative impact on the risk [3].
And if an incident occurs, at which point would the customer be required, for
example, to notify the insurance company, when the timing here could have a
signicant impact on damages? Important questions include to what extent in-
surance holders are obliged to report on their actions, changes and incidents,
and how they are incentivized to undertake precautionary measures if any loss is
covered anyway. As such, buying insurance policies may just become an alterna-
tive to actually improving their security [57]. On the other hand, Toregas et al.
[56] point out that dierentiated premiums for high and low risk customers could
be essential here to stimulate ICT security investments in parallel. It should be
discussed how periodic checkpoints involving smaller audits or self assessments
can be used to avoid worsening the information asymmetry and rather try to
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improve it over time, and allow insurers a correct impression of who are their
high and low risk customers.
4.5 Business model for insurers (P5)
As with any insurance scheme, the premium paid by all insurance policy holders
should cover any payouts plus return prot to the insurance company. As such,
the insurers seek a mix of customers that provide a sucient premium income
compared to the overall risk portfolio, and a steady ow of payouts. This is espe-
cially a challenge for insurance companies in covering risk which may be globally
correlated and interdependent [3]. Simultaneous attacks related to a specic op-
erating system or software component, such as the Heartbleed bug [17], could
quickly escalate into situations which reach catastrophic dimensions [19]. For
these situations insurance companies normally have re-insurance, i.e. insurance
for their obligations, which would cover them from potential bankruptcy. There
are, however, still no re-insurers for cyber-insurance policies [56]. Hence, some
policies exclude certain risks in this category from their coverage [20]. For the
particular case of state sponsored cyber-attacks, it is an open question whether
these should rather be covered by government re-insurance, such as the US Ter-
rorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) [49]. Through being connected to a global
Internet one is exposed to cyber-attacks originating from outside the national
borders, and the question will arise of who is then responsible for re-insurance.
There might also be dierences between countries or regions in terms of culture
and how damages are calculated.
An important perspective in this respect is which data will be part of the
insured business, and how the data could potentially aect third parties. For
example, if credit card information is stored, nancial liability could be involved
in the case of a breach, and coverage should be priced accordingly. This is in
contrast to risk that only aects the rst party, such as loss of prots through
business interruptions or extortion [25]. The provisioning of insurance to third
parties is an alternative to pay-outs that is currently being oered by some in-
surance companies, at least in the US [37]. A breach could, for example, expose
customers of the insured, e.g. private individuals whose credit card numbers
are stored in the breached system(s), and an identity theft insurance or credit
monitoring services could for instance be provided to each of the aected in-
dividuals [40]. In contrast to traditional payouts which only have a cost, such
cyber-liability coverage could rather extend the market reach for the insurance
company. Worth noting is that there is supposedly no correlation between the
number of records lost and the total cost of the breach [38].
5 Understanding and Measuring Risk (R)
For organizations, cyber-insurance is one of several risk-treatment strategies.
Understanding the risk and the factors that inuence the risk is important both
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to evaluate whether or not the risk is acceptable, and to what extent cyber-
insurance can reduce the risk to an acceptable level. For insurance companies,
understanding risk is important for dierentiating policy terms and premiums,
to prevent adverse selection [45].
5.1 Key risk inuencing factors, and their relations (R1)
The risk to an organization is dependent on internal as well as external condi-
tions. Central to the concept of risk is the assets of the organization and how
vulnerable they are to threats. Internal factors inuence the value of the asset
as well as the risk, both negatively in form of errors/failures or insider attacks,
and positively in form of implementing measures and contributing to resilience
towards cyber-threats. Important internal risk inuencing factors include the
people working for the organization and their risk awareness and behavior, the
technology the organization is using and its vulnerabilities and preventive mea-
sures, and how the organization is managed and the routines in place that are
relevant when it comes to cyber-security. Organizations have a relatively high
level of control over these internal risk inuencing factors. However, in addition
to internal factors, the risk is dependent on external factors over which the orga-
nization has more limited inuence. Examples of external threats are failures of
infrastructures that the organization relies on (examples could be communica-
tion network failures or power failures) and attacks by various attacker groups.
Societal changes may also inuence risk, in form of technology changes, political
actions or public opinion. In addition, organizations typically rely on vendors,
service providers or partners for various tasks. Cyber-incidents of such third par-
ties may thus also have consequences for the organization, or vendors or partners
may cause cyber-incidents in the organization itself. Getting insurance may in-
uence the security work in the organizations, either positively or negatively
(moral hazard [3]). With all these factors to consider, and limited knowledge of
the impact of the various factors on the organization's experienced cyber-risk,
risk is complex to understand and evaluate. This is true for the organization
itself, but obviously also for an insurance company oering cyber-insurance to
the organization (asymmetric information [12, 3]).
Risk modeling is a technique for risk identication and assessment, and the
literature oers several tree-based and graph-based notations. Fault tree analysis
(FTA) [28], event tree analysis (ETA) [29] and attack trees [53] are examples of
the former and provide support for reasoning about the sources and consequences
of unwanted incidents, as well as their likelihoods. Cause-consequence analysis
(CCA) [39], CORAS [34], and Bayesian network [9] are examples of graph-based
notations.
In the context of cyber-insurance, technological, organizational and human
factors need to be modeled when assessing risk. Hence, expressiveness and scal-
ability of the modeling approaches are crucial. While scalability is mainly con-
cerned with the size of the eventual risk models, expressiveness is subject to what
factors can be included in the model and reasoned about. The above mentioned
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approaches vary in these respects, as well as in their ability to model risk in
terms of costs.
5.2 Measuring cyber-security in terms of costs (R2)
Risk modeling methods often lack techniques and tools for analyzing the associ-
ated cost and the return of investment of alternative risk treatments. Franqueira
et al. [21] address this problem by proposing a method for handling security
investment decisions achieved by so-called Real Option thinking. The method
is partly based on Real Option Analysis (ROA) [1], which is a decision support
technique in the area of capital investment by means of mathematical models
to evaluate nancial options. Other approaches to cost estimation in the setting
of security investments are Net Present Value (NPV) [18], Return on Security
Investment (ROSI) [54], Architecture Trade-O Analysis Method (ATAM) [32],
the Cost Benet Analysis Method (CBAM) [31] and the Security Solution De-
sign Trade-O Analysis [27]. These and similar approaches can be understood as
methods and techniques to facilitate security economics. In the context of cyber-
insurance, two main criteria will be relevant for the choice of a cost modeling
approach, namely dynamics of the cost over time, as well as availability of the
input needed to estimate the needed model parameters. The above mentioned
methods vary in this respect.
The eventual concern of risk management is how to provide the decision
makers with an informed picture of the situation upon which they can condently
reason and act. When modelling risk, the main source of evidence is most often
expert judgments, measurements and historical data. However, such empirical
evidence are all characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Research and
practice on measuring information security has progressed, and there are many
indicators and measurement frameworks available, see e.g. Herrmann [26] and
ISO/IEC 27004. Still, there is no agreed upon set of metrics that are considered
most important to predict information security risk in the general case [56].
5.3 Taking into account dynamics of technology and risk (R3)
The cyber-risk picture may change rapidly due to technology changes, discovery
of vulnerabilities, political actions, etc. There is a need to understand how to take
these changes into account when it comes to cyber-insurance. Organizational
resilience, i.e. the capability of recognizing, adapting to and coping with the
unexpected [58], is thus relevant to consider. In the safety domain, research
has progressed on measuring organizational resilience through risk awareness,
response capacity and support [43], and such a measurement framework has
been adapted to the ICT domain [10].
As a result of the rapid technological development and changes in attacker
proles, empirical information on incidents quickly becomes outdated. This in-
creases uncertainty. When working quantitatively, a practical approach to take
uncertainty into account, is in our experience to use intervals [24, 33, 44]. The
intuition is then that the width of the interval species the level of uncertainty.
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An interval is a special kind of distribution, namely the \at" distribution. The-
oretically, allowing also other kinds, such as Gaussian [14] distribution, would
be preferable since this provides more information. Another relevant issue in the
uncertainty handling is reliability and validity of the security assessment models.
In other words, is the uncertainty of the models tolerable, and do the models
suciently represent reality? Validity and reliability issues of security risk mod-
els have been elaborated on based on types of uncertainty representations, and
based on the type of empirical input provided into the models. The problem
in practice is to decide which approach to use and how. Comprehensibility is a
major issue and performs dierently among the various approaches. A simple,
qualitative or frequency-based representation of the estimates is assumed to be
generally more comprehensible than, for example, probabilities [22]. At the same
time, the richer the representation, the more of the information available can be
expressed with the needed precision.
6 Estimating Consequences of Cyber-Incidents (C)
Being able to estimate and measure the impact of cyber-incidents is important
for both organizations and insurance companies: for setting premiums, for policy
making, for making risk-based decisions on cyber-insurance, and for claims pay-
out in case of an incident. Access to historical data on cyber-incident cost can
improve ability to predict costs. Alternatively, the relationships between causes
and eects of incidents need to be understood, so that costs can be modelled
and estimated.
6.1 Historical data on cyber-incident costs (C1)
The lack of robust actuarial data has been pointed out by various sources as a
reason for limited success of the cyber-insurance market [7, 19, 20, 56]. Barriers
for information sharing include reluctance by rms to reveal details on security
incidents [7, 23, 56] and limited ability to quantify costs associated with cyber-
incidents [56]. Toregas and Zahn make the following claim: \Given that many
companies are either unaware of a cyber attack or unwilling to disclose such
attacks, and added to the fact that those attacks are hard to quantify, actuarial
data for the cyber-insurance market is missing and unlikely to be available in the
near future" [56] Various sources of historical cyber-incident information exist,
e.g., from CERTs, prot companies or researchers [19]. Examples of surveys
that provide relevant data on costs of cyber-incidents include a NetDiligence
survey of insurance payouts related to cyber-liability [38] and Ponemon's Cost
of Data Breach Study [48]. However, it is not easy to determine which sources
of information should be relied upon more than the others [19]. To illustrate,
the average cost reported for a breached record diers a lot between the 2014
versions of NetDiligence report and the Ponemon report; the NetDiligence study
reports an average per record cost of $956.21 and a median cost of $19.84, while
Ponemon reports an average cost for each lost or stolen record to be $145. There
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may be good reasons for these signicant discrepancies in the numbers reported.
An obvious reason is that the NetDiligence report reports only insurance payouts,
and not the total cost of the incident. Also, the scopes of the surveys are dierent.
Still, such large dierences results in great uncertainties in what cost to expect,
and it may be a cause to question the reliability of the data.
6.2 Models for understanding causes and eects of cyber-incidents
(C2)
Bandyophyay et al. [7] divide costs of cyber-incidents into two broad categories:
primary and secondary losses, where primary losses refer to direct loss and op-
erating loss and secondary losses refer to any second-degree eects that are
indirectly triggered by information concerning the security of the company (e.g.,
reputation damage or credit rating). ISO/IEC 27005 [30] in a similar fashion
talks about immediate (operational) and future (business) eects. The imme-
diate eects are then further divided into direct and indirect impacts. Direct
impacts include cost of replacing the asset (acquisition, conguration, installa-
tion), the cost of suspended operation, and the experience of an information
security breach. Indirect impacts include opportunity costs, cost of interrupted
operations, potential misuse of the information, and violations of statutory or
regulatory obligations as, well as ethical codes of conduct.
In general, cyber-incidents can have a long time span: the time between a
vulnerability is introduced in the software till the vulnerability is exploited, and
then till the attack is detected, can be quite long, and still it may take more
time till the consequence of the incident is fully experienced. The immediate
impact is relatively easy to identify, but indirect impacts and secondary losses
may be dicult to fully understand, and they may also materialize long after
the detection of the incident [15, 7]. Several factors may impact the costs. As an
example, Bandyophyay et al. [7] explain how the decision to report the incident
to an insurance company can increase the cost associated with the incident: the
reporting may result in the breach becoming known to external parties, and
thus secondary losses is experienced. Also, it is not always clear what costs are
actually due to the incident. Cashell et al. [15] point out potential unclarities
in this respect when it comes to direct costs (which are most likely the easi-
est type of costs to measure): \If an attack leads to increased spending on IT
security, to what extent are those costs attributable to the attack? If a planned
upgrade in hardware or software is accelerated after an attack, should the upgrade
be classied as a security cost?" [15] Understanding and agreeing upon which
consequences are actually due to an incident is likely to be more challenging for
indirect and secondary losses.
According to Bohme and Schwartz [12], cyber-risk is characterized by both
interdependent security and correlated risk; the security of a node is dependent
on the security of other nodes and incidents may strike in a correlated fashion.
Interconnected nodes [3, 12] and dominant products [3] are key causes for this
interdependency. An incident in one organization may thus cause or increase
likelihood of incidents in another organization. This risk comes in addition to
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the potential impact of an incident on other rms up and down the supply chain
[15]. These are not costs to the target organizations, and will thus usually not
show in any cost estimates, but can still be severe. For insurance companies,
these characteristics increases risk of concurrent claims [3].
The challenges of asymmetric information [12] also apply to cost estimation
after a cyber-incident. Lack of understanding of costs, and in particular sec-
ondary losses, may result in overpriced contracts [7]. In addition, it is important
that organizations understand what parts of the cyber-incident costs are covered
by an insurance policy. Thus, adequate models for understanding cyber-incident
impacts is important for a well-functioning cyber-insurance market.
6.3 Metrics and models for measuring costs of cyber-incidents (C3)
As the cost elements associated with cyber-incidents are not fully understood and
agreed upon, dierent actors may have very dierent opinions on how incident
costs should be measured. An insurance company would be concerned about
arriving at reliable measures of the types of cost that is relevant for claims
payout. Organizations would in addition be interested in getting an overview of
the actual costs of an incident and what types of impacts that contribute most
to the total costs, for input to risk management. Concerning cyber-insurance,
organizations would benet from an understanding of how much of the expected
incident costs would actually be covered by a policy. This dierence in focus
is evident when looking at what cost items are considered in the NetDiligence
survey of cyber-claims payouts [38] compared to the Ponemon study on costs of
data breaches [48]. The claims payouts in the NetDiligence survey covered crisis
service costs as well as legal and regulatory costs. The Ponemon study included
detection and escalation costs, notication costs, post data breach costs and lost
business costs. In most countries, lost business costs are the highest, with post
data breach costs coming second and detection and escalation costs third. There
is no direct mapping between the cost categories in the two studies, but for
simplication and comparison you could say that the crisis service costs in the
NetDiligence survey is mainly part of the escalation and notication costs in the
Ponemon study, and that legal and regulatory costs are mainly part of the post
data breach costs. Thus, major cost items identied in the Ponemon study seem
to not be relevant for the claims payouts surveyed by the NetDiligence study.
When the cost items to be measured have been identied, it may still be chal-
lenging to come up with reliable metrics. The Ponemon study explains at a high
level how they collect and calculate the costs of a data breach. The estimation
of most of the costs is based on identifying activities, and then the companies
estimate a cost for these activities. Examples of an activity can be \Conduct-
ing investigations and forensics to determine the root cause of the data breach"
[48]. Then the activities are categorized into cost categories. For opportunity
costs they estimate \turnover of existing customers" and \diminished customer
acquisition" based on interviews with management. Though these measurement
approaches are relevant and likely to result in useful data, they are prone to
biases and are probably not reliable enough for claiming insurance payouts.
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7 Discussion
In the following we make recommendations for further research and discuss the
validity of these recommendations.
7.1 Recommendations for further research
Table 1 provides an overview of main knowledge gaps related to cyber-insurance,
based on the above description of the identied knowledge areas. Clearly, there is
a need for more research on several topics related to risk management, security-
economics, business models, decision models and more. As an example, progress
in understanding and measuring cyber-incident risk and cost in economic terms
is very important for improving cyber-insurance products, as well as decision-
making on whether or not to buy insurance. These are, however, active re-
search elds of their own. Actors in the cyber-insurance domain would bene-
t from following the research in these elds so that the progress being made
there can be used to improve the understanding of the cyber-insurance market
and make a foundation for better cyber-insurance oerings. Still, the cyber-
insurance research should address research questions that are specic for cyber-
insurance. There is a need to understand the decision models used related to
cyber-insurance, and what factors inuence the demand for cyber-insurance
products (P1,2,3). There is a need to understand the barriers for eective infor-
mation sharing between insurance companies and organizations, so that these
can be addressed in an eective manner (P4). And there is a need to understand
how cyber-insurance impacts the security in the organizations and of society
(P4,R1). There are also important challenges to be solved regarding business
models for insurers (P5), especially when it comes to re-insurance opportunities.
As can be seen from Table 1 there is a need for improved models and methods,
and probably also tools, related to cyber-insurance. At the same time, any such
developments should be based on knowledge of the actual needs and challenges
of the actors, and that any artifacts are properly evaluated to nd whether
or not they meet the needs. Today, there are some data available, mainly in
form of statistics. In this report we have referred to statistics on incident costs
[48], claims payouts [38] and cyber-insurance adoption [47]. Although there is a
need for more and improved statistics related to cyber-insurance, there is also a
need for more qualitative empirical research to increase understanding of these
statistics. Such research is needed to understand both the demand and supply
side of the cyber-insurance market. Important questions to study with respect
to insurance companies are:
{ What customer segment do you want to target with your cyber-insurance
policies?
{ What are the main obstacles with oering and selling cyber-insurance cov-
erage? Why?
{ What types of cyber-incidents are you most interested in issuing coverage
for? Why?
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Area Knowledge gap
Cyber-insurance products
P1  What is the current uptake and market trends for cyber-insurance around the
world?
 What causes regional variations?
P2  How are governments and other authorities inuencing the market and role of
cyber-insurance products?
 How can governments act as re-insurer facilities for incidents with a global span?
P3  What are the key dierentiating factors for dierent customer groups when it
comes to evaluating cyber-insurance oerings?
 How are cyber-insurance decisions made in the organizations?
 How can policy terms be communicated in an eective manner to those roles
that are typically involved in making cyber-insurance decisions?
P4  What information, and what amount of information, are businesses willing to
provide to an insurance company, in order to obtain a cheaper premium | or
to obtain insurance at all?
 At which points should status and changes to the risk landscape be communi-
cated between the insured party and the insurance company?
 Will companies actually implement security improvements in order to obtain
cheaper premiums, rather than simply rely on cyber-insurance alone? And how
can insurance companies act to reduce moral hazard?
P5  What private and public initiatives could address cyber-insurance market chal-
lenges, e.g., the lack of re-insurance?
 What role could cyber-liability insurances play in the mix of cyber-insurance?
 How will an insurance company deal with cases of extraordinarily high claims?
Understanding and measuring risk
R1  What are the key risk factors and their relations?
 How does cyber-insurance inuence the security of organizations, positively and
negatively?
R2  What standardized metrics are most useful for evaluating cyber-risk and cost?
 How can methods for collecting and analyzing measurement data be improved
to reduce measurement costs and increase reliability?
R3  How can measurement frameworks and metrics suciently take into account
changes in technology, business and environment?
Estimate consequences
C1  What actuarial data is most needed when it comes to cyber-incident costs?
 How can such data be collected and made available in a manner that provides
sucient trust in the reliability of the data?
C2  What are the key cyber-incident impact types?
 What alternative criteria could be used for claiming that an eect is caused by
an incident?
 How can incidents be modeled in order to capture how various actions associated
with an incident may impact the consequences of the incident, putting particular
emphasis on the timing aspects?
C3  What are current experiences and needs when it comes to measuring cyber-
incident costs?
 How can metrics for key cyber-security cost items be standardized?
Table 1. Identied knowledge gaps
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{ What cyber-insurance terms (what is insured, support in case of an incident,
duration of policy, etc.) do you oer, and how and why have you decided on
these terms?
{ How do you deal with the timing issue of cyber-incidents (late detection,
secondary impacts)? Why have you selected this approach? How easy is it
to communicate with customers about these issues?
{ What type of process would you prefer for customer segregation (evaluating
risk, setting of premiums)? Why?
{ Do you experience challenges regarding access to necessary information (rel-
evant for risk analysis or for claims payout in case of incidents) from cus-
tomers? Do you take any measures to increase willingness to share informa-
tion with you? Why have you decided on those measures, and do they give
the eect that you wanted?
For organizations that have bought an insurance, or have considered to buy
insurance, important questions to address are:
{ What motivates you to buy cyber-insurance? Why?
{ If a vendor has been insured, how would that impact your evaluation of this
vendor? Why?
{ What characteristics of a cyber-insurance product makes it interesting for
your organization? Why?
{ What factors make a cyber-insurance product less attractive for your orga-
nization? Why?
{ What types of cyber-incidents are you most interested in coverage for? Why?
{ How do you experience the process of comparing dierent cyber-insurance
oering? What makes it easy/hard?
{ What decision basis and what decision process do you use when deciding
whether or not to buy cyber-insurance? Should any aspect of this process
be improved, and why?
{ What type of benets (size of claims payout, support, etc.) are important in
case you experience an incident? Why?
{ How willing is your organization to share security information with an in-
surance company? What can insurance companies do to increase willingness
of organizations to share information with them?
{ Is the work on cyber-security in your organization inuenced by your decision
to buy (or not buy) cyber-insurance? How, and to what extent?
Several research methods are available for qualitative research [51]. For studies
that aim at understanding the viewpoint of several actors, we envision the use
of qualitative interviews or focus groups [55]. For studies that want to go into
detail on one or a few actors or products, case studies [59] would be a relevant
research method, e.g. combining interviews, document studies and observations
to provide a deeper understanding of the case studied.
7.2 Validity
In this report we have, based on a study of current literature related to cyber-
insurance, identied a set of knowledge gaps, and provided suggestions for what
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type of research is most needed in the near future. Though we have collected
information from various written sources, including both academic literature and
other material, there is a possibility that we have missed relevant work. Still, we
claim that our work provides a thorough overview of the current literature on
using cyber-insurance as a risk management strategy.
Our review of the literature has identied a lack of empirical data on cyber-
insurance. Due to this lack of empirical data it is dicult to know what are
the dierent actors' needs when it comes to cyber-insurance. Thus, there is a
limited basis for making prioritizations as to what knowledge gaps are most
pressing to address. This impacts the validity of our conclusions. The need for
more empirical data is real, but our recommendation to focus on cyber-insurance
specic topics related to decision models, barriers for information sharing, impact
on cyber-insurance on security, and business models, may be altered based on
new empirical data becoming available.
8 Conclusion
This report has reviewed current literature related to cyber-insurance, and iden-
tied important knowledge gaps that need to be addressed to support a more
eective cyber-insurance market. In particular, more empirical data is needed,
both in form of qualitative and quantitative studies. While some quantitative
data is already collected, we identify a need for qualitative studies that can pro-
vide more insight into the underlying factors and thus guide understanding of the
quantitative data. We recommend that research should address cyber-insurance
specic topics related to decision models, barriers for information sharing, impact
on cyber-insurance on security, and business models. Still, improved knowledge
on risk management and security economics is essential also for cyber-insurance,
and the research in these elds should be followed closely by actors in the cyber-
insurance domain to utilize the newest insights on understanding risk and cyber-
incident in terms of cost.
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